ABSTRACT Safety-critical embedded systems in application domains, such as aerospace, automotive, and industrial automation, must satisfy dual requirements of fault-tolerance and real-time predictability. Control flow checking is an effective technique for improving embedded systems' reliability by online monitoring and checking of software control flow to detect runtime deviations from the control flow graph. However, inserting instrumentation code in every basic block incurs significant execution time overhead, which may cause the program to violate its timing constraints. In this paper, we propose to selectively instrument a subset of code regions that are larger than basic blocks, called super-nodes, in order to make the program partially resilient to control flow errors while keeping the program worst-case execution time (WCET) below a given upper bound. WCET analysis is invoked to estimate the program WCET and to identify the corresponding worst-case execution path (WCEP). An ILP formulation is used to judiciously select a subset of super-nodes on the WCEP for instrumentation, so that the best fault detection coverage is achieved without violating the given WCET upper bound. The optimization is repeated for each identified WCEP until the program WCET satisfies the WCET upper bound. Experimental results demonstrate significant improvements of fault detection coverage compared with related work.
I. INTRODUCTION
Real-time embedded systems in many application domains, such as aerospace, automotive and industrial automation are often safety-critical, and their malfunction may lead to catastrophic consequences, including loss of human life. As semiconductor technology scales down further, decreasing size, capacitance and threshold voltage level of devices allow better performance and lower power consumption, but also make devices more susceptible to transient faults, especially for embedded systems operating in harsh environments, such as aerospace or automotive systems. Specifically, we focus on transient faults caused by harsh environmental conditions such as intensive space radiation, and assume the common Single-Event Upset (SEU) fault model.
For protecting against soft errors in the memory subsystem, including main memory and cache, Error-Correcting Code (ECC) is an effective mechanism. In fact, ECC is a mandatory requirement for memory components used in safety-critical application domains, such as satellite and aerospace applications. But other mechanisms are needed to harden the processor pipeline against transient faults. One approach is to use Dual Modular Redundancy (DMR) or Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR), which executes redundant copies of the same program on two or three identical processing elements and compares their outputs, to detect both control flow and dataflow errors. Another approach is to use radiation-hardened processors that are resistant to space radiations. Such approaches are very effective in achieving fault-tolerance, and are suitable for safety-critical applications that can afford the cost, but may not be feasible for mass-produced consumer products such as automotive electronics that are highly cost-sensitive, and the designer must resort to software and compiler techniques to achieve fault tolerance. Another motivating application scenario is pico-satellites based on Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) smartphones [1] , which must achieve fault-tolerance with low cost commercial hardware.
Transient faults may cause either Control Flow Errors (CFEs) or dataflow errors. A CFE disrupts normal control flow of a program by causing the program counter to jump to an erroneous location, whereas a dataflow error affects numerical results of computation without altering the control flow. Compared with dataflow errors, CFEs are more likely to cause severe failures such as program crash and hang, and are the focus of this paper.
A software program consists of a number of Basic Blocks (BBs). A BB is a straight line of instructions that are always executed from the beginning to the end at runtime, without any Control Flow Instructions (CFIs) in the middle. A program's Control Flow Graph (CFG) has nodes representing BBs and edges representing valid control flow between the BBs. A CFE occurs when runtime control flow deviates from the program CFG. There may be three types of CFEs: branch insertion error: a non-control flow instruction is changed to a CFI; branch deletion error: a control flow instruction is changed to a non-control flow instruction; branch target modification: target address of a control flow instruction is modified. Many Control Flow Checking (CFC) techniques [2] , [3] have been proposed to detect and/or correct CFEs caused by transient hardware faults, both hardware-based and software-based. Hardware-based CFC techniques incur low runtime overhead but require modification to commodity hardware. Software-based CFC does not require hardware modification, but the additional instrumentation code typically incurs large performance overhead.
For real-time systems, correctness depends not only on producing correct results, but also on correct timing of delivering the results. To make system-level timing guarantees, it is a prerequisite to provide an upper bound on each individual task's Worst-Case Execution Time (WCET) [1] , which is much more important than its Average-Case Execution Time (ACET). Safety-critical embedded systems must satisfy the dual requirements of timing predictability and fault-tolerance simultaneously. Previous work has focused on optimizing the average-case performance, but has not adequately addressed WCET requirements in hard realtime systems. In order to achieve practical deployment of software-based CFC techniques on resource-constrained hard real-time systems, Gu et al. [5] presented WCET-Aware Control Flow Checking (WACFC), which allows flexible tradeoffs between fault detection coverage and program WCET by instrumenting a select subset of BBs in the CFG. In this paper, we present WCET-Aware Control Flow Checking with Super-Nodes (WACFC-SN) by extending WACFC in [5] to use the concept of super-nodes to further improve efficiency and fault coverage. Table 1 summarizes the main abbreviations used in this paper.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses related work, including WCET analysis and optimization, software-based CFC, super-node-based CFC and WCET-aware partial CFC; Section III presents the details of our proposed algorithm WACFC-SN; Section IV presents experimental results, and Section V concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK A. SYSTEM-LEVEL FAULT-TOLERANCE TECHNIQUES
Researchers have addressed the intersection between realtime systems and fault-tolerance at the system-level, where multiple tasks are managed by a real-time operating system. Zhu [6] presented reliability-aware energy management schemes that dynamically schedule error recoveries for tasks to compensate for reliability loss due to dynamic voltage and frequency scaling. They also exploited checkpoint techniques to efficiently use the runtime timing slack. Li et al. [8] presented a reliability-guaranteed energy-aware frame-based task set execution strategy for hard real-time systems, where processing resources are reserved to re-execute tasks when transient faults occur. Li et al. [7] presented algorithms for runtime reconfiguration of a defect-tolerant manycore Network-on-Chip when defective cores are replaced by backup cores. The above papers generally assume each task's WCET is given as problem input, and address system-level multi-tasking issues.
B. WCET ANALYSIS AND OPTIMIZATION
WCET analysis consists of two steps [4] : the low-level analysis step determines execution time of BBs, taking into account effects of micro-architectural structures (e.g., cache, pipeline, etc.); the high-level analysis step takes the execution time of BBs as input and determines the global WCET of the program according to its CFG. Since exhaustive enumeration of all program execution paths is computationally infeasible, the prevalent approach to WCET analysis is the Implicit Path Enumeration Technique (IPET) [9] based on an ILP formulation.
A program's WCET is determined by the Worst-Case Execution Path (WCEP), defined as the program execution b ∈ B n } 34: Actually instrument every n ∈ N selected path with the largest possible execution time. In general, the WCEP may be a rarely-executed ''cold path'' that has a very small probability of occurring at runtime, but it is still important to account for it when computing the WCET for hard real-time systems. By contrast, other shorter paths with smaller execution times may be frequently-executed ''hot paths'' that determine the Average-Case Execution Time (ACET), but do not contribute to the WCET. Whereas conventional compiler optimization algorithms aim to reduce ACET, Suhendra et al. [10] and Wang et al. [11] , [12] presented compiler optimization algorithms that aim to decrease program WCET by allocating program data variables to onchip scratchpad memory. A challenge in WCET reduction is the so-called WCEP switch, i.e. after reducing the execution time of the current WCEP, a new path may become the new WCEP that determines the WCET. Therefore, the designer needs to optimize each identified WCEP as the current WCEP switches among different paths during the optimization process, until the program WCET falls below WCET ub . References [10] - [12] start with a program with all data variables in off-chip main memory, and gradually allocate data variables in each BB to on-chip scratchpad memory to reduce program WCET. Similarly, we start with a program with full Control Flow Checking, and gradually reduce its WCET by instrumenting only a selected subset of super-nodes, until the desired WCET upper bound is reached.
C. SOFTWARE-BASED CONTROL FLOW CHECKING
Software-based CFC techniques [2] typically work by inserting additional checking code, called instrumentation code, at the beginning and end of each BB. Each BB has associated entry and exit signatures computed offline to encode some invariants derived from the CFG. As control flow passes through a BB at runtime, the instrumentation code in each BB computes the signatures, typically with bitwise AND/XOR operations, and compares the runtime signatures with the precomputed expected signatures. In case of a mismatch, a CFE is detected and the error handler is invoked. Different CFC algorithms differ in the technical details of computing and checking signatures, but the overall framework is the same. Our approach in this paper is independent of the specific details of the CFC algorithm adopted, and is broadly applicable to other CFC algorithms.
Although only a few instructions are added to each BB, the total runtime overhead of CFC is quite significant, since most BBs contain only a few instructions (e.g., 3-6 for typical MIPS programs) on average for typical non-scientific program workloads [13] . The high performance overhead of software-based CFC makes it unsuitable for resourceconstrained embedded systems. Vemu and Abraham [14] and Khudia and Mahlke [15] have presented techniques for reducing runtime overhead of software-based CFC, but they focused on average-case performance instead of worst-case performance as measured by the program WCET, which is more important to hard real-time systems.
D. SUPER-NODE-BASED CFC
In order to reduce overhead, Vemu and Abraham [14] proposed node expansion, i.e., to insert instrumentation code only to the beginning and end of each super-node instead of each BB ( Fig. 1 (b) ), thus reducing the amount of instrumentation code and its runtime overhead. A super-node is a single-entry single-exit code region, where each execution of the header must be followed by one execution of the footer, and vice versa. A super-node is said to be on an execution path if its header (and footer) is on the path. With super-nodes based CFC, CFEs within each super-node cannot be detected; only CFEs between different super-nodes can be detected.
Here are the basic definitions of super-nodes: Super-nodes are different from super blocks in compiler optimization [17] . A super-block is an execution trace, i.e., a linear sequence of BBs with no side entrances. Control flow may only enter from the top but may leave at one or more exit points. In contrast, a super-node consists of a directed graph of BBs with possible control flow within the supernode. If a BB in a super-node is on an execution path, only the header and footer of the super-node are guaranteed to be on the execution path, while the other BBs may or may not be on the path depending on runtime control flow decisions.
Two different super-nodes n i and n j may be either disjoint or overlapping (Fig. 2) . If n i and n j contain at least one common BB, then n i and n j overlap with each other (e.g.,
). For two overlapping super-nodes n i and n j , if n j is a true subset of n i , then n i includes n j (e.g., (b 1 , b 9 ) includes (b 2 , b 5 )). We refer to n i as an outer node of n j , and n j as an inner node of n i . If neither of two different overlapping super-nodes includes the other, then the super-nodes partially overlap each other (e.g., (b 6 , b 7 ) and (b 7 , b 8 )). A super-node n j is said to conflict with another super-node n i if n i includes or partially overlaps n j .
E. WCET-AWARE PARTIAL CFC
Assuming that WCET of the original program without CFC instrumentation, WCET orig , does not exceed WCET ub ; and WCET FCFC , WCET of the program with full CFC instrumentation on all BBs, exceeds WCET ub , Gu et al. [5] presented WCET-aware partial CFC that allows flexible tradeoffs between fault detection coverage and program WCET, and provides a tunable fault detection technique that can be adapted by the designer to suit the needs of different applications. It works by selectively instrumenting a subset of BBs in the program to endow the program with partial fault detection capability while keeping its WCET within a given upper bound WCET ub . The objective is to achieve reasonable fault detection coverage within a reasonable upper bound on the program WCET, where the notion of reasonable should be application-dependent and specified by the designer. If the processor workload is light, or the processor has enough computing power, then more BBs can be instrumented to achieve higher fault detection coverage; if the system is overloaded, then the designer may choose to instrument fewer BBs to reduce the workload. However, partial CFC may not be applicable to certain highly safety-critical applications, e.g., avionics control systems, and full CFC must be used even if it is necessary to add more processors or switch to a faster processor to reduce the per-processor workload.
III. WCET-AWARE CONTROL FLOW CHECKING WITH SUPER-NODES
We now present our main contribution, the WACFC-SN algorithm, which consists of two parts: Global Super-node Selection, a heuristic algorithm, and Path-local Super-node Selection, an ILP formulation. We start with a program with full CFC, and WCET exceeding the designer-specified upper bound WCET ub . During each iteration, we perform WCET analysis to obtain the program WCET and identify the current WCEP. If the current WCET exceeds WCET ub , we invoke the Path-local Super-node Selection algorithm to reduce execution time of the WCEP by instrumenting only a selected subset of super-nodes on the current path. After this step, a new path may become the WCEP, so we perform WCET analysis again, and repeat this process until the program WCET falls below WCET ub . We first present the definition of CFE Detection Capability, then the Path-local Super-node Selection algorithm, and finally the Global Super-node Selection algorithm.
A. CFE DETECTION CAPABILITY
The probability of transforming a non-branch opcode to a branch opcode (and vice versa) due to a single bit flip is generally assumed to be very low [15] , [16] . We adopt the same assumption in this paper, and focus on CFEs due to branch target modification.
When a CFE occurs, control flow is directed from a source CFI to an erroneous target instruction. Transient faults may occur anywhere in the processor pipeline, from instruction fetch, to decode, to execute, and to retirement. Consider a CFI, e.g., a branch or jump instruction. The instruction may have a field encoding the target address. As long as the instruction stays in the processor pipeline, it may be affected by a transient fault, such as a bit-flip in the pipeline register where the target address is stored, which may cause a CFE. Therefore, the longer a CFI stays in the processor pipeline, the more vulnerable to soft errors it becomes. The total time a CFI spends in the processor pipeline during a program run depends on both the instruction execution time (i.e., the time each execution of the instruction takes) and the execution frequency of the instruction. For any given CFI, its execution frequency determines its total execution time. We assume that the probability for a CFI i to experience a CFE at runtime is proportional to the average-case execution frequency F i of the CFI. By definition, each BB b contains at most a single CFI, hence the average-case execution frequency of a CFI is equal to the average-case execution frequency F b of its BB that contains it. We collect the average-case execution frequency F b of every BB by profiling the program with random inputs.
We now consider the destination of the CFE, i.e., the code region that is the target of invalid control flow due to the CFE. A large super-node that spans a large range of memory addresses is more likely to become the destination of a CFE than a smaller super-node, assuming that all memory addresses have equal probability of being the target of a CFE. For a RISC processor where all instructions have the same length (number of bits), we define the size of a given supernode n as the total number of instructions in all BBs B n contained in it:
where IC b is the instruction count, i.e., number of instructions in BB b. We assume the probability for a super-node n to become the destination of a CFE is proportional to the size of the super-node. For a given super-node n, the probability for a CFE that jumps from a CFI outside the super-node to some instruction inside the super-node is proportional to the average-case execution frequency of the source CFI times the size of the destination super-node:
CFC instrumentation of a super-node enables detection of CFEs that direct control flow from a CFI outside the instrumented super-node to some instruction inside that supernode, but not vice versa. In each instrumented super-node, instrumentation code is added to both the beginning of the header and the end of the footer to update the runtime signature and check it against a pre-computed expected signature. At compile-time, a unique expected signature is assigned to the inside of each instrumented super-node. If no CFE occurs, the runtime signature is updated to the expected signature at the beginning of the header of the super-node, which is expected by the signature check at the end of the footer. If a CFE directs control flow from a CFI outside the super-node to the inside of the super-node, the runtime signature is not updated at the beginning of the header of the super-node, and thus will not match the expected signature for the inside of the super-node. Such a mismatch will be caught by the signature check at the end of the footer of the super-node and the CFE is detected. If a CFE directs control flow to an instruction outside any super-node, control flow may or may not pass through a signature check after the CFE occurs. Furthermore, if a CFE directs control flow between two instructions that are not inside any super-node, the expected signatures at the instructions may be the same. In either case, the CFE may go undetected.
The observation above motivates our definition of Supernode CFE Detection Capability D n of super-node n as a metric to estimate the fault detection coverage provided by an instrumented super-node n:
where B is the set of all BBs in the program code, B n is the set of BBs in super-node n. Intuitively, super-node n's CFE detection capability is proportional to its size, i.e., number of instructions inside the super-node, and the sum of averagecase execution frequencies of all CFIs outside the super-node. To estimate the fault detection coverage of an execution path p with a selected set N p selected of instrumented supernodes, the Path CFE Detection Capability D p of the path is defined as the sum of Super-node CFE Detection Capabilities of all instrumented super-nodes on the path:
Similarly, for a program with a selected set N selected of instrumented super-nodes, the Program CFE Detection Capability D can be defined as the sum of Super-node CFE Detection Capabilities of all instrumented super-nodes in the program code:
This Program CFE Detection Capability serves as a proxy for the actual fault detection coverage, which can only be obtained through fault injection experiments, but not expressible analytically. Experimental results confirm that this objective is more effective than the objective of maximizing the total average execution time of instrumented BBs in the program in [5] .
B. ILP FORMULATION FOR PATH-LOCAL SUPER-NODE SELECTION
In this section, we present the ILP formulation for the Path-local Super-node Selection algorithm, which selects a subset of candidate super-nodes N candidate on the current WCEP for instrumentation to maximize the Path CFE Detection Capability while keeping the execution time of the path below WCET ub . For each candidate super-node n on the current WCEP, a 0-1 variable x n is associated with it to indicate whether the super-node is selected for instrumentation (x n = 1) or not (x n = 0). The optimization objective is to maximize the Path CFE Detection Capability of the current WCEP: (6) where N WCEP denotes the set of super-nodes on the current WCEP. This definition of the Path CFE Detection Capability is equivalent to (4).
One constraint is that execution time of the current WCEP must not exceed WCET ub :
where WCET orig denotes the original WCET of the program without any instrumentation; ec h n denotes the execution count of the header BB h n of super-node n on the current WCEP, which is also the execution count of super-node n on the current WCEP; OH inst denotes the instrumentation overhead, i.e., the additional execution time of any single super-node due to additional instrumentation code.
Another constraint is that overlapping super-nodes, i.e., super-nodes that contain the same BB, must not be selected for instrumentation simultaneously:
where The optimization objective (6), and constraints (7)(8) form the ILP model of the Path-local Super-node Selection algorithm. The algorithm may reduce execution time of a path in two ways. First, if more than one super-node on the path has previously been selected for instrumentation and some of the selected super-nodes are inner nodes of the same super-node, then the common outer node may be selected for instrumentation instead of its inner nodes. In this case, the program loses the ability of detecting invalid control flow between different parts within the outer node. Second, a super-node on the path which has previously been selected for instrumentation may be de-selected. In this case, the program loses the ability of detecting invalid control flow from the outside of the super-node to its inside. In both cases, the CFE Detection Capability is reduced for a decrease in execution time of the path.
It is not possible to formulate a unified ILP model to optimize (5) , because WCET analysis with IPET [9] involves an ILP formulation with the objective of maximizing program execution time. Hence we cannot express the WCET upper bound constraint in (7) with a set of linear constraints in the overall ILP model with the objective of maximizing (5).
Next, we introduce the Global Super-node Selection algorithm (Algorithm 1).
C. GLOBAL SUPER-NODE SELECTION ALGORITHM
We assume a program without any CFC instrumentation satisfies the given WCET ub . We first identify the set of all super-nodes (N ), and the set of overlapping super-nodes Overlap (b) which contains the same BB b for each BB (Lines 2-7) . The algorithm starts with a fully instrumented program, where every BB, i.e., singleton super-node, is marked as instrumented and the instrumentation overhead OH inst is added to the execution time of every singleton super-node (Line 8). The set N candidate of candidate supernodes is initialized to contain all (possibly overlapping) super-nodes (Line 9). The candidate super-nodes in N candidate are the only super-nodes that may be selected for instrumentation by the Path-local Super-node Selection algorithm. We do not actually instrument or un-instrument super-nodes until the end of the algorithm, when the program's WCET satisfies WCET ub and all super-nodes to be instrumented are determined.
If the current program WCET exceeds WCET ub , then we gradually reduce the amount of instrumentation code until the program WCET falls below WCET ub (Lines 10-32). We first perform WCET analysis to obtain the program WCET and the corresponding WCEP (Line 10), which consists of a set of tuples {(b, ec b )} denoting each BB b on the WCEP and its execution count ec b . If the current WCET exceeds WCET ub (Line 11), we select a set S of super-nodes on the current WCEP from N candidate by invoking the Path-local Super-node Selection algorithm (Line 12). The super-nodes selected by the Path-local Super-node Selection algorithm are marked as instrumented and other super-nodes on the current path are marked as un-instrumented (Line 13). Then, super-nodes that conflict with any of the selected super-nodes are marked as un-instrumented and removed from N candidate (Line 15). This ensures that the execution time of a selected super-node will not be increased by preventing its inner nodes from being selected for instrumentation. Super-nodes that do not conflict with any selected super-node remain in N candidate and may be selected later when a different WCEP is optimized or when the same WCEP is optimized again.
When the execution time of the current path is decreased below WCET ub , we perform WCET analysis again to identify the new WCEP (Line 31). This process is repeated until the program WCET falls below WCET ub , when we have found a valid solution, and can proceed to actually instrument the selected super-nodes. To keep track of the selected supernodes, we maintain a set B covered of BBs, which contains headers of super-nodes that are selected for instrumentation. Initially, the set B covered contains all BBs of the program to reflect the fact that every singleton super-node is initially selected for instrumentation (Line 9). After every invocation of the Path-local Super-node Selection algorithm, B covered is updated to contain headers of the selected super-nodes on the current path as well as headers of selected super-nodes on other paths (Line 14). When the program WCET is decreased below WCET ub , for each b ∈ B covered , the innermost supernode n ∈ N candidate that covers b is actually instrumented (Lines 33-34).
D. DEADLOCK PREVENTION
From Algorithm 1, we can see that the state of N candidate is closely related to whether the algorithm terminates or not. Every time the Global Super-node Selection algorithm optimizes a path, some candidate super-nodes may be removed from N candidate so that they will not be instrumented. Supernodes are never added to N candidate after it is initialized. Therefore, as long as the algorithm keeps removing supernodes from N candidate , the set will eventually become empty, and the algorithm will terminate. However, the algorithm might stop removing super-nodes from N candidate and stop making progress under certain circumstances, if no mechanism were incorporated to prevent deadlocks.
As an example, consider We note three necessary conditions for causing such a deadlock.
1) A set of execution paths that pass through at least two common super-nodes are optimized repeatedly in alternation. 2) No super-node is removed from N candidate , since supernodes that conflict with any of the selected super-nodes have already been removed.
3) For at least two of the common super-nodes, optimization of the multiple execution paths disagree on whether the super-nodes should be selected for instrumentation or not. To detect and prevent deadlocks, we incorporate a Deadlock Prevention mechanism in the Global Super-node Selection algorithm, which runs every time the algorithm finishes optimizing a path (Lines 16-30) . It detects potential deadlocks by checking conditions 1) and 2) above. If no candidate super-node is removed from N candidate (Line 16), a deadlock may occur in the future, and the Deadlock Prevention mechanism is triggered. We maintain a set N deadlock containing candidate super-nodes on the paths that are recently optimized since the last time N candidate starts to remain unchanged. If N deadlock has not converged to a fixed set, i.e., a candidate super-node on the current path has not been added to N deadlock (Line 23), then the current path has not been optimized since the last time N candidate remains unchanged, and there is no deadlock. In this case, all candidate super-nodes on the current path are added to N deadlock (Line 24). If N deadlock has converged to a fixed set, then a potential deadlock is detected.
To resolve the deadlock, we can force progress by removing a super-node from N candidate . We choose to remove the candidate super-node that is the most likely to cause disagreement. When optimization for a path disagrees with optimization for another path on whether a common super-node on the paths should be selected for instrumentation or not, it changes the selection state of the super-node, i.e., it either selects the super-node that was not previously selected for instrumentation, or de-selects the super-node that was previously selected. We assume a super-node that has experienced the most selection state changes is the most likely to cause disagreement, and maintain a state change counter sc n for every super-node n ∈ N deadlock . When N candidate remains unchanged and a candidate super-node n on the current path is added to N deadlock , if the super-node has not been previously added to N deadlock , then its state change counter sc n is set to zero to indicate that it has not experienced any change in its selection state (Line 21). For a super-node that is already in N deadlock , if its selection state changes, its state change counter is incremented (Lines 18-20) . When a potential deadlock is detected, the super-node in N deadlock that has experienced the most selection state changes is marked as uninstrumented and removed from N candidate (Line 26) to force progress, and its header is removed from B covered (Line 27). Meanwhile, since the deadlock is broken, N deadlock is cleared (Line 28).
With the Deadlock Prevention mechanism, the Global Super-node Selection algorithm always terminates. Every time a path is optimized, the algorithm either makes progress by removing a super-node from N candidate (Line 15), or checks N deadlock to detect a potential deadlock (Line 23). If N deadlock converges to a fixed set, then the algorithm forces progress by removing a super-node from N candidate (Line 26). Otherwise, it adds all candidate super-nodes on the current path to N deadlock (Line 24). N deadlock definitely converges to a fixed set after a finite number of paths are optimized, since N candidate is a finite set. In the worst-case, N deadlock converges to N candidate when all super-nodes in N candidate are added to N deadlock . The convergence of N deadlock to a fixed set will in turn force progress by removing a super-node from N candidate . In all cases, a super-node is removed from N candidate after a finite number of paths are optimized, and the algorithm can always make progress.
IV. EVALUATION AND RESULTS

A. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
We evaluate the WACFC-SN algorithm with fault injection experiments. Fig. 4 shows the overall experimental setup. We use the commercial WCET analyzer aiT from the company AbsInt (https://www.absint.com/). aiT takes as input a binary executable file and the hardware processor specification, and derives the program WCET estimate and the corresponding WCEP. We use the Freescale PowerPC 5554 processor, a widely-used ECU in automotive systems, and one of the processor models supported by aiT. The instrumentation overhead OH inst is assumed to be 80 cycles, which is the maximum observed execution time incurred by the instrumentation code plus a safety margin.
We use a diverse collection of programs from the Mälardalen WCET benchmark suite [18] in our experiments. We use the LLVM compiler framework [19] to compile each benchmark program into LLVM Immediate Representation (IR), which is the input for further analysis and transformation. To obtain average execution frequencies of BBs, the LLVM IR is linked with a program-specific module that generates random inputs for the program at runtime. The program is run 1000 times with different random inputs, and the VOLUME 6, 2018 execution frequency of every BB is collected using the profiler llvm-prof. We use the collected execution frequency of every BB as the average-case execution frequency of the BB. We then generate target binary executable from the LLVM IR by using a suitable LLVM backend in preparation for WCET analysis. The LLVM IR and the BB execution frequency profile are fed into the WCET-aware CFC partial instrumenter, along with the designer-specified WCET ub . To facilitate comparison among different programs, we use the normalized WCET upper bound ratio (WCET ub /WCET orig ) in the experimental results. The partial instrumenter invokes the external WCET analyzer with information about currently instrumented super-nodes to update itself with the current WCEP and WCET, and finally produces the enhanced LLVM IR with instrumentation.
We conduct fault injection experiments with an in-house fault injector, which simulates CFEs by processing the instrumented LLVM IR. The WCET-aware CFC partial instrumenter is run on each benchmark program with a series of different WCET upper bound ratios. For each one, 2000 fault injection experiments are conducted to evaluate the fault detection coverage. Fig. 5 shows workflow of each fault injection experiment. For each experiment, a single random CFE is injected into the instrumented LLVM IR to simulate the effect of a transient fault, consistent with the common SEU fault model. To ensure that each injected fault is activated, the program is run twice with the same random inputs for each fault injection experiment. During the first run, no fault is injected and the execution trace is extracted. In particular the number of executions of each BB (which is also the number of executions of the CFI in the BB) is collected in a similar way as BB execution frequency profiling. During fault injection, the fault injector chooses a random CFI, which is executed at least once on the execution trace of the first run, as the source CFI of the CFE, and ensures the CFE is activated only once during a program run. For the second run, the program with the CFE is run. The program output and the exit code are collected and examined to determine whether the CFE is detected or not. 
B. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
For each benchmark program, we vary the WCET upper bound ratio from 1.0 to 2.0. Fig. 6 shows how the Program CFE Detection Capability varies with the WCET upper bound ratio. We can see that a significant increase in the Program CFE Detection Capability is achieved at the expense of a small increase in the program WCET for most programs. Similarly, as can be seen in Fig. 7 , a significant increase in the number of BBs that are covered by instrumented supernodes is achieved at the expense of a small increase in the program WCET for most programs. Note that a larger number of covered BBs does not imply a higher CFE Detection Capability. For example, when a large super-node is instrumented, all basic blocks in the super-node are covered. But invalid control flow between different parts within the supernode cannot be detected. An increase in the WCET upper bound ratio may allow two or more inner nodes of the large super-node to be instrumented instead of the large supernode. The instrumented inner nodes may not cover all BBs of the large super-node, but invalid control flow between the inner nodes can be detected.
For fault detection ratios, we compare with the algorithm WACFC-BB (WCET-Aware Control-Flow Checking based on Basic Blocks) in [5] . Fig. 8 shows comparisons between fault detection ratios for the benchmark programs. As expected, the fault detection ratios for both algorithms increase with increasing WCET upper bound ratio in general. WACFC-SN significantly out-performs WACFC-BB on most of the benchmark programs, and achieves similar fault detection ratios on the others (with a few exceptions, e.g. fdct). It is not surprising that the fault detection ratio does not increase strictly monotonically with the WCET upper bound ratio, due to the heuristic nature of our algorithm and optimization objective, as well as the inherent randomness of fault injection experiments.
We attribute the better efficiency of WACFC-SN to several reasons: 1) Super-node based CFC provides a larger design space than BB-based CFC, since a BB is a singleton super-node, leading to potentially better results.
2) The optimization objective CFE Detection Capability is an improvement over the simplistic optimization objective in [5] .
3) For reducing execution time of the current WCEP at each iteration of the algorithm, we formulate and solve an ILP problem (Section III-B) to select the set of super-nodes to be instrumented on the WCEP. This is more effective than the simplistic approach of iteratively selecting and un-instrument the BB on the WCEP that contributes the least to the ACET in [5] .
For most benchmark programs that are relatively small, the algorithm running time is several minutes. For larger programs, e.g., nsichneu with 4000+ lines of code, the framework finishes within several hours.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we present WCET-Aware Control Flow Checking based on Super-Nodes (WACFC-SN), which trades off real-time performance for error resilience by applying CFC instrumentation on a select subset of super-nodes.
We evaluate fault detection coverage of WACFC-SN under various WCET upper bounds by fault injection experiments, and demonstrate significant improvements compared with related work.
APPENDIX
In the appendix, we use a toy example to illustrate the Global Super-node Selection algorithm. Fig. 9 shows the CFG of a program with 10 BBs. There are two loops in the CFG, one containing BB b 9 , and the other containing BB b 10 b 10 ) and (b 1 , b 10 ) . 
However, due to re-instrumentation of (b 9 , b 9 ), execution time of the right path is increased to 88 > WCET ub . The path is identified again as the WCEP, and the same set of super-nodes will be selected for instrumentation. But the reinstrumentation of (b 10 , b 10 ) will in turn increase the execution time of the left path to 87 > WCET ub . The algorithm would go into an infinite loop, and keep switching between the two paths without making any progress.
With the Deadlock Prevention mechanism, the algorithm checks N candidate and finds that the set stays unchanged after the second time the right path is optimized, which indicates a potential deadlock. So the algorithm adds all candidate super-nodes on the right path to N deadlock . The state change counter sc n for each of the super-nodes n in N deadlock is set to zero, since the super-nodes have not been added to Once again, the re-instrumentation of (b 9 , b 9 ) causes the right path to be identified as the WCEP and optimized. (b 9 , b 9 ) is un-instrumented, and (b 10 , b 10 ) is re-instrumented. Both super-nodes experience another selection state change, so sc (b 9 ,b 9 ) and sc (b 10 ,b 10 ) are increased to 2. N candidate remains unchanged again. Furthermore, N deadlock also converges to a fixed set, which indicates that the algorithm is trapped in a finite set of paths and a deadlock has probably occurred. So the candidate super-node in N deadlock that has experienced the most selection state changes, i.e., (b 9 , b 9 ) or (b 10 , b 10 ), is un-instrumented and removed from N candidate , and its header is removed from B covered . Suppose (b 9 , b 9 ) is uninstrumented and removed from N candidate . The deadlock is now broken, so N deadlock is cleared. At this point, the WCET of the right path is 79 < WCET ub = 85.
Re-instrumentation of (b 10 , b 10 ) again causes the left path to be optimized. But this time, (b 9 , b 9 ) is not in N candidate and will not be instrumented. The algorithm un-instruments (b 10 , b 10 ) to decrease the execution time of the path, and removes b 10 
